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SUMMARY 
In this essay I consider whether or not there is a need for the creation of the crime of 
negligent assault. I start off by giving a brief exposition of the current position in 
South Africa with regard to assault. From this exposition it becomes clear that 
negligent assault is not recognised in South African law. I give a brief summary of 
the concepts of intention and negligence. After this I briefly discuss what criteria 
should be considered before invoking the criminal sanction. 
In the next section of the essay I consider the need for, and the benefits of, creating 
the crime of negligent assault. 
Lastly, I critically analyse whether the legislature should intervene or not. My 
conclusion is that the social benefits of criminalising the conduct do in fact 
outweigh the negative implications of not criminalising it, and that the legislature 
would not err if it were to create the crime of negligent assault. 
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1. ASSAULT: GENERAL 
A) Current position in South African law.9 
Assault as we know it today was unknown in our common law. Conduct, which would 
today constitute criminal assault, was punished as a form of iniuria. 10 Under the 
influence of English law, assault in South African law developed into a separate crime. 
Assault is a crime committed against another's corpus. It now forms part of a trinity of 
personality interests protected under South African law. The other two interests 
protected are dignitas11 and fama12. Assault is therefore nothing other than an iniuria 
committed against another's bodily integrity.13 
The fundamental principle is that physical force, of whatever sort and in whatever 
degree, should not be applied to the body of another. 14 This principle has been 
entrenched by the new Constitution, which protects a person's right to his physical 
integrity15 and human dignity.16 By recognising that the human body is not made up 
only of flesh and blood, but also the mind, the crime of assault punishes not only 
applications of force to the corpus, but also the application of force to the mind. It 
does this by punishing, as assault, the inspiring of fear in the mind of a person that he 
9 The SA definition of assault (supra) emanates from the Transkeian Penal Code of 1886 s 10. 
10 Voet 47 10. 
11 Punished as the crime of crimen iniuria. 
12 Punished as the crime of defamation. See Van der Berg J "Should there be a crime of defamation?" 1989 
SALJvol 102, 276 - 291. 
13 Jack1923 AD 176. 
14 PMA HUNT South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol II 3rd ed (JRL Milton) (19%) 407 - "This 
principle derives from law's concern to maintain law and order. It is human nature to react to violence 
directed at one's person, thus creating the potential for further violence and, ultimately public disorder." 
15 See supra. 
16 See supra n. 7 & 8. 
3 
or she is about to suffer physical harm. 17 
The strong influence of English law has resulted in the development of a number of 
qualified forms of assault, for example assault with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm and indecent assault. However, a discussion of these forms of assault does not 
fall within the ambit of this essay. I will therefore restrict my discussion to common 
assault. 18 
B) History 
As stated above, assault as we know it today was unknown in common law. 19 The 
Romans regarded bodily aggression as just one way of committing the much wider 
wrong of iniuria. 20 It is not clear whether the Romans regarded all iniuriae as 
criminally punishable, or whether only serious iniuriae were punishable. There does, 
however, seem to be authority supporting the proposition that all physical assaults 
were punishable as crimes. 21 
However, under the influence of English law, assault in our law developed into a 
separate substantive crime, being an iniuria committed against a person's corpus. 
In early English law, infliction of violence upon the person of another would have 
17 Sibanyone 1940 55 40 (T); Afiya 1%6 (4) SA 274 (N) 276-277. 
18 Also known as "ordinary assault". 
19 See supra n 10. 
20 Which included the infringements of the corpus.Jama and dignitas. 
21 Melius de Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch of Injuries, 1899 160-3; De Wet & Swanepoel, Strafreg, 4th 
ed 1985, by De Wet JC, 234. 
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resulted in private vengeance. The law sought to prevent this. The courts wanted to 
maintain public peace and order, and thus punished the wrongful trespass upon 
another person causing actual physical harm (known as 'battery'). The law also 
deemed it necessary to punish the unlawful inspiring of fear in another person that he 
was going to be attacked(known as 'assault')22, as this could also have resulted in 
retaliation and private vengeance. 
South Africa has adopted the English law's notion of assault.23 However, despite the 
fact that our definition of assault24 does not distinguish between the English law 
concepts of 'assault' and 'battery', these concepts have now fused together, resulting 
in the single crime of assault. 25 
C) Essential Elements 
The essential elements of assault are:a) applying force or inspiring apprehension of it; 
b) unlawfully; c) intentionally.26 
a) Applying force or inspiring the apprehension of it 
22 i.e. creating in the mind of a person the apprehension that he or she was about to experience a battery. 
23 Jolly 1923 AD 176 at 179; Marx 1962 (1) SA 848(N). 
24 See supra. 
25 This was reflected in the definition ofassault in the Transkeian Penal Code in 1886. s 152 reads: "An assault 
is the act of intentionally applying force to the person of another, if or attempting or threatening, by making 
any act or gesture to apply such force to the person of another, if the person making the threat has or causes 
the other to believe on reasonable grounds that he has the present ability to effect his purpose." 
26 Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 480. 
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Applying force is the most common way in which assault is committed. Subject to the 
de minimis rule27, even the slightest contact with another person's body may be 
sufficient.28 
The application of force may be direct or indirect, for example pulling out a person's 
chair or derailing a train.29 
Assault can even be committed by means of an omission. In B, 30 a woman was 
convicted of assault for failing to prevent her lover from assaulting her young child. 
As a mother, she was under a legal duty to protect her young child, and she failed to 
act positively to do so. 
b) Unlawfully 
As with any crime, the act of assault31 must be unlawful32. 
However, due to the fact that human beings live in a community which is conducive 
to physical contact33, it would be impossible to regard every touching that might 
occur as assault. For this reason, various grounds of justification exist which 
negate the unlawfulness of various acts. The following are the most common 
grounds of justification: a) authority34; b) defence of person or property35 and c) 
consent36. 
27 See Bester 1971 (4) SA 28 <n. 
28 E.g. bumping someone or grabbing their arm. 
29 Jolly 1923 AD 176 at 179. . 
30 1994 2 SACR 237 (E). 
31 Applying of force or inspiring apprehension that force is to be applied. 
32 Conduct is unlawful if it is in conflict with the boni mores or legal convictions of society. See Snyman op cit 
(n 1) 90. 
33 E.g. touching another person whilst in a full lift or whilst passing each other in a corridor. 
34 Since the Constitutional Court in Williams 1995 (2) SACR 251 (CC) found corporal punishment to be 
unconstitutional, it is no longer possible for a court to impose corporal punishment. 
35 Van Wyk 1967 1SA488 (A). 
36 Whether consent legalises an assault depends on the boni mores. 
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Assault can also be committed, although there is no physical contact between 
parties. This occurs where X inspires the belief in Y that force is immediately to be 
applied to him. 37 This type of assault has developed due to the influence of 
English law. 38 The assault is committed by an act or gesture that leads the victim 
to believe that he is about to suffer an attack. 39 It is not relevant whether the 
person committing this type of assault has the ability to carry out the threat. All 
that is important is whether or not the victim has such apprehension. 40 
c) Intentionally 
Subjective mens rea, in the form of do/us, must be proven.41 
Thus, X must have intended to apply force to the person of another, or to threaten him 
with immediate personal violence.42 
Do/us eventualis is sufficient for a conviction43. For do/us eventualis to be present, X 
must foresee the possibility that his conduct may result in the direct or indirect 
application of force to Y's person or that it might inspire in Y the fear that such force 
would be immediately applied, and he must then reconcile himself to such possibility 
and proceed with his conduct. 44 
37 See references supra n 17. 
38 See op cit n 22. -
39 It is controversial whether mere words can amount to an assault. It would, however, appear that there is no 
reason why mere words cannot inspire a very real apprehension in the mind of the victim that he is about to 
suffer an assault. See Hunt op cit (n 14) 237. 
40 Whether or not the apprehension by the victim has to be reasonable or not is a controversial issue. Burchell and 
Milton, supra (n 1) 485 are of the view that any person who intentionally induces in the mind of a foolish 
person, an unreasonable apprehension that he is about to be attacked, clearly commits assault. 
41 Nkosi 1928 AD 488 at 488; R v Daniels 1926 (2) PH Hl09 (C). 
42 X must therefore have been aware of Y's fear. 
43 Sikunyana 1961 (3) SA 549 (E) at 552; Sinzani 1979 (1) SA 935 (E). 
44 This is based on Snyman's formulation of do/us eventualis. Burchell and Milton, supra (n I) 305 have a 
different approach. 
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X must have mens rea in respect of each element of the crime. 45 Since the 1950's, 
our courts have held that intention is purely subjective. 46 The task of the court is to 
determine what the state of mind of the accused was at the time when he committed 
the offence. Mens rea will therefore be lacking if X makes a bona fide mistake47 of 
fact, for example, X believes that circumstances exist which entitle him to act in self-
defence, whereas in fact no such circumstances exist. 48 
As has already been indicated above, our law does not know the offence of negligent 
assault.49 
D) Attempt 
In terms of the previous definition of assault50, attempt to apply force to the person of 
another was equated with the threat of applying such force. Due to this definition, the 
view has been taken that there is no such crime as attempted assault. All attempts to 
assault were deemed to be complete assaults.51 It is submitted that this view is wrong. It 
is based on the incorrect assumption that every threat of bodily harm will give rise to a 
corresponding fear of such harm on the part of the threatened person. In reality 
however, this does not always happen. 52 Thus in such cases there is only attempted 
assault.53 
45 Except for intention itself. 
46 Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 (A) 694; Mini 1963 (3) SA 188 (A) 192. 
47 The term bona.fide mistake is perhaps confusing. A mistake by its very nature can only but be bona.fide. 
48 Botes 1966 (3) SA 606 (0) at 611. 
49 Steenkamp supra (n 4). 
50 See Transkeien Penal Code of 1886 ibid n 9. 
51 Barden 1942 JS 117 (f). 
52 For e.g.: where Y is unaware of the threats because he is asleep, or he does not understand them because he is 
drunk. 
53 The same view is held by Snyman supra 417 and Hunt supra 483. 
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In Sikhakane54 the court recognised that there is a crime of attempted indecent assault. 
Since indecent assault is a species of assault, this may serve as authority for the 
proposition that there is such a crime as attempted assault. 
2) INTENTION AND NEGLIGENCE 
From the above it is evident that assault is a well-developed common law crime in the 
South African legal system. Courts55 and authors56, while perhaps differing slightly on 
some of the elements of the crime57, seem to be in agreement regarding the element of 
mens rea. Only intention58 suffices. 
A Intention 
Intention can take three different forms: do/us directus59, do/us indirectus60 and do/us 
eventualis61 . Intention consists of two elements62, namely X's knowledge of the 
surrounding circumstances and the means which he must employ in order to achieve his 
goal63 and secondly, X's directing his will towards achieving the particular result or 
54 1985 (2) SA 289 (N). 
55 Daniels supra (n 2); Sikunyana supra (n 3). 
56 Snyman op cit (n 1) 199; Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 413; 478. 
57 Especially regarding the second way in which the crime can be committed i.e. the inspiring of a belief that 
force is to be applied. See Snyman op cit (n 1) 415. 
58 In whatever form. 
59 The person directs his will towards performing the prohibited act. 
60 The prohibited act is not the perpetrator's main aim, but he realises that if he wants to achieve his main aim, 
the prohibited act will out of necessity ensue. 
61 The person foresees the possibility of the prohibited result ensuing from his act, but reconciles himself to such 
foresight and proceeds with his conduct. 
62 Snyman op cit (n 1) 168. 
63 Known as the cognitive element. 
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performing a particular act.64 
The test in respect of intention is purely subjective.65 When determining whether a 
person had intention, the court must determine whether the person actually had the state 
of mind required for intention.66 Intention must exist in respect of each element of the 
crime. Once this is established, then it is easy to establish legal guilt. Since the essence 
of mens rea is blameworthiness, the courts can justify blaming someone for subjectively 
directing their will towards a particular result, with knowledge of unlawfulness.67 If a 
person's intention does not relate to all the elements of the crime68, then he can not be 
held liable. This situation is referred to as 'mistake'. Due to the subjective nature of 
intention, such mistake need not be reasonable.69 
Mistake is a defence excluding intention. There are also other defences that exclude 
intention70, but a discussion of these defences is not required here. 
B. Negligence71 
Before I can discuss negligent assault, I will need to give a brief exposition of what 
negligence entails. 
The law does not only punish unlawful acts that are committed intentionally, but also in 
some circumstances punishes unlawful acts that are committed unintentionally. 
64 Known as the conative element. 
65 Snyman op cit (n 1) 173; Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 519 - see also supra n 46. 
66 I.e. both cognitive and conative elements. 
67 Or in the case of do/us eventualis, for subjectively foreseeing the possibility that your conduct is prohibited 
and reconciling yourself to such possibility. 
68 According to Snyman. supra (n 1) 176, these include the following: the act, the definition of proscription and 
unlawfulness. 
69 Modise 1966 (4) SA 680 (GW). 
70 These include inter a/ia: youthfulness; intoxication; insanity; provocation. 
71 The word culpa is often used as a synonym for negligence. 
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The law does this when an act is committed negligently. Negligence is a term used in 
law to indicate that the conduct of a person has not measured up to a prescribed 
standard. 72 
According to Snyman73, the test for negligence is the following: 
"a) Would the reasonable person (diligens paterfamilias) in the circumstances in 
which X found himself have foreseen the possibility that the particular circum-
stances might exist or that the particular consequences might result from his act? 
b) Would the reasonable person have guarded against these possibilities? 
c) Did X's conduct deviate from what a reasonable person would have done in the 
circumstances?74" 
The same test in respect of negligence is found in criminal and private law. 75 
Negligence can be distinguished from intention. 76 Intention involves a purposefully 
chosen course of action, knowing it to be unlawful. It is an enquiry into the actual state 
of mind of the actor. The test for negligence is not what the actor thought or foresaw, 
but rather what a reasonable man would have done in the circumstances. The test is 
objective.n Therefore, intention can be regarded as a particular state of mind, whereas 
negligence (in the case of unconscious negligence) can be regarded as the absence of 
a state of mind.78 
72 Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 352. 
73 See op cit (n 1) 199. 
74 A similar formulation is advocated by Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 356; See also Kruger v Coetzee 1966 
(2) SA 428 (A) 430. 
75 Krugerv Coetzee supra (n 74); Russell 1967 (3) SA 739 (N). 
76 Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A) 686 C-D. 
77 The objectivity of negligence is a controversial issue in South African law. This issue will be briefly discussed 
below. 
78 Ngubane supra (n 70) at 686 - 687. 
II 
Conscious negligence should be distinguished from unconscious negligence.79 
In the case of unconscious negligence, X does not foresee the prohibited circumstances 
or result.80 In the case of conscious negligence, X does foresee it, but unreasonably 
decides that it will not ensue.81 Conscious negligence is not a form of intention. Unlike 
do/us eventualis where X reconciles himself to his foresight, in the case of conscious 
negligence X does not reconcile himself - he unreasonably decides that the 
circumstances do not exist or that the result will not ensue. 
As stated above, the test for negligence is in principle objective. This is because the 
question to be answered is whether the reasonable person82 would have foreseen the 
result and would have guarded against it. According to Snyman83, the objective 
character of the test is subject to a few exceptions. These are the following: 
a) The reasonable person should be placed in the circumstances in which X found 
himself at the critical moment. 
b) In the case of experts, a reasonable expert as opposed to a reasonable man, 
should be placed in X's circumstances. 
c) The same applies when determining the negligence of children. A reasonable 
child should be placed in X's position. 
Many authors criticize the objective nature of the test for negligence.84 
79 See Bertelsmann 1975 SA.LI 59. 
80 With circumstance crimes it is a particular circumstance which renders a particular act unlawful. With result 
crimes (or materially defined crimes) it is the particular result which is forbidden. 
81 As a reasonable person he should foresee it. 
82 The reasonable person is a fictitious person who personifies the average; normal person. The reasonable 
person concept embodies an objective criterion. 
83 See op cit (n 1) 203. 
84 Snyman op cit (n 1); De Wet and Swanepoel op cit (n 21) 159, Boberg PQR "The Little 
Reasonable Man" SA.LI 85 (1968) 127. Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 352. 
' 
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In a heterogeneous society like South Africa, a purely objective test may lead to 
injustice, as it does not take into account the enormous disparity between levels of 
education, superstitious beliefs85, idiosyncrasies and intelligence levels which can be 
found in the country. 
Clearly, what is reasonable for one person may not necessarily be reasonable for 
another.86 The nature of the test for negligence still attracts vigorous academic 
comment87, but need not be discussed further in this essay. 
C. Negligence in South African Criminal Law 
i) Common-law Crimes 
Historically, the common law punished negligence only where it resulted in the death of 
another human being. 88 
In more recent times, the courts have held that negligence is a sufficient form of fault for 
a conviction for the common law crime of contempt of court.89 This will be the case when 
dealing with the liability of an editor of a newspaper who publishes matter which 
constitutes contempt of court. 90 
ii) Statutory Offences 
The doctrine of strict liability91, which is encountered in statutory crimes, has not been 
well received by the judiciary. In an effort to try and reduce the harsh effects of the strict 
85 Ngema 1992 (2) SACR 651. The case dealt with the superstitious belief in the tikoloshe. 
86 For e.g. a bricklayer and a scientist. 
87 R Louw "Criminal Negligence and Mens Rea: Is the reasonable man test an unreasonable one" LLM 
dissertation (University of Natal) 1993. 
DA Botha "Culpa - A form of mens rea or a mode of conduct? 1977 SALJ 29. 
88 Punished as the crime of culpable homicide. 
89 Harber 1988 (3) SA 396 (A) 312; see also JM Burchell (1988) 4 SAJHR 375 ff. 
90 Intention or negligence will be a sufficient form of fault. 
91 Liability without fault. 
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liability doctrine, judges have been prepared to let the accused escape liability if he can 
show that his contravention of the statute was not negligent.92 In doing this, the courts 
have given effect to the need to impose stricter standards of care and circumspection. 
Negligence may be the fault element of a statutory offence even though negligence as 
such is not the gist of the offence created by the enactment. The question whether the 
legislature intended negligence to constitute the fault element of a particular offence will 
depend on the foresight or care which the statute in the circumstances demands.93 
Negligence as a form of fault provides a useful middle course between intention-based 
liability and the rigid strict liability criterion. In order to determine whether the legislature 
contemplated negligence as the fault element of an offence, the following factors must be 
considered: a) the language of the enactment; b) the scope and object of the enactment; 
c) the ease with which liability may be evaded if intention instead of negligence is 
required; d) the punishment prescribed and e) reasonableness of assuming that 
culpability is not required.94 
iii) Feasibility of punishing negligence 
Whether negligence should be punished or not is still very much a moot issue amongst 
writers. Some writers are of the opinion that only conscious negligence95 should be 
punished. If negligence is unconscious then it is not deserving of punishment. 96 It is 
also contended that to punish unconscious negligence does not encourage people to be 
more careful, since the person gives no thought to his actions, and thus the deterrent 
theory of punishment is not satisfied. 97 
92 R v H 1944 AD 121at130; Federated Meat Industries Ltd 1949 (2) SA 795 (N) 797. 
93 Arenstein 1964 (1) SA 361 (A) at 366. 
94 A discussion of these considerations is not required here. See Snyman op cit (n 1) 232 - 233. 
95 supra 
96 Since it is not morally blameworthy. 
97 Morkel 1986 JJS 84; JC Smith and Brian Hogan Criminal Law, 7'h ed 1992, 96-98. 
14 
I agree with Snyman98 in saying that negligent conduct, whether conscious or 
unconscious, should be punished. The punishment of negligent conduct puts people on 
their guard. This is particularly important in today's technological era, which involves 
partaking in many potentially dangerous activities (for example driving a car, flying a 
plane or handling a firearm). These activities all require a certain minimum degree of 
care and circumspection. 
With regard to negligent assault, everybody also has a constitutional right to his or her 
physical integrity.99 Therefore, a person who undertakes an activity, which involves the 
risk of injuring another person, should be held to even a higher standard of care and 
circumspection in the light of the new constitutional dispensation. 
98 
op cit (n 1) at 194. 
99 See supra (n 7). 
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3) WHEN IS CONDUCT DESERVING OF CRIMINAL SANCTION? 
To criminalise or not? This has become an important question in the legal world. 
Criminal sanction has become a popular method of social control. According to Burchell 
and Milton 100 the function of criminal law is to coerce members of society, through the 
threat of pain and suffering, to abstain from conduct, which is harmful to various 
interests of society. Its object is to promote the welfare of society and its members by 
establishing and maintaining public peace and order. However, not all conduct, which 
may be harmful to society, may be criminalised. The law has to strike a delicate balance 
between effective criminalisation and overcriminalisation. When criminalising conduct, 
one needs to distinguish between two types of crimes: 
i) Common law crimes: Certain crimes in our law have existed since earliest 
times. 101 These crimes are known as common law crimes and exist as part of our 
criminal law simply due to the fact that they appear as crimes in the sources of 
South African common law. In the past judges 102 "invented" new common law 
crimes by simply pronouncing that they existed. This practice was welcomed at 
that stage, due to the fact that there was no other effective way to meet the needs 
of the rapidly changing times. 103 
100 Op cit (n 1). 
101 for e.g. murder, assault, perjury, theft. 
102 un.o "'Are +l.o ;n+orn•otA•r nnd A~nn-'lo•s of'+l.o ~n ........ nn 
vv ii "'"' "' Ul'"' J.1ll\.I yu .. '"''"' a.u '-'ApallU\.ll J. lJ.1\.1 \.rVJ.lllllVU. 
103 See Glanville Williams Criminal Law: The General Part 2"d ed 592. 
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However, today we do have effective means to create new laws. Parliament has 
the duty to create new crimes, and thus it is no longer the function of the 
judges to extend or create new common law. 
ii) Statutory Crimes: In modern parliamentary democracies, law-making power rests 
in the legislature. Due to the fact that the list of common law crimes is now 
closed, the only way that new laws can be created is by an enactment of 'the 
legislature'.104 Since the democratically elected legislature expresses the will of 
the majority of the people, it follows that the legislature in creating new crimes 
closely reflects the attitudes and values of the people. It would therefore appear, 
that the only way in which negligent assault can be criminalised, is by means of 
legislative enactment. 
If the purpose of criminal law is to prevent people from committing acts which are 
harmful to society interests,105 then it would appear a simple solution to the problem, to 
criminalise all conduct which unlawfully106 cause harm to another. In modern western 
democracies, the wide range of interests that are considered worthy of protection 
through criminal sanction, has led to a massive increase in the number of crimes that 
have been created. 
104 All lAairlnti"on pasrA~ h .. pa .. l;am-• mnrf l.n ... uAUA¥ be co~~au"hle u_,;t" fl.a ~onr•;tu•;n~ an~ m' n<>rh~nl., .. fl.A 
"'bJ.13 a ~ U) 1 1 1 \.lllL ll~l llVn'"'""'J 111}1 u nl 11 Ul\.I"" 1.;)Ul uvu IU l ~u."'Ula.a Ul"' 
Bill of Rights. Any legislation fr.at is found to be unconstitutional ·.vill be decla.~d i.'l.valid by the 
Constitutional court. 
105 Cee ""' u~ ..., .,,.p, ... 
106 For an explanation of the concept ofunla\\fulness see supra n 28. 
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Criminalising conduct has many implications, over and above the fact that the person 
committing the prohibited act is punished.107 All the consequences of criminalising a 
particular form of conduct must be considered before such decision is taken. It has 
been argued that many western democracies have over-utilised criminal sanctions and 
that some societies face a 'crisis of overcriminalisation'.108 
It would therefore appear, that before jumping in headfirst and criminalising a particular 
form of conduct to achieve social goals, the lawmaker should carefully consider whether 
or not to invoke the criminal sanction. Packer109 suggests the following criteria, that 
could act as guidelines to the lawmaker. 
"1) The conduct is prominent and in most people's view, threatening behaviour. 
2) Subjecting it to punishment is not inconsistent with the goals of punishment. 
3) Suppressing it will not inhibit socially desirable conduct. 
4) It may be dealt with through even-handed and non-discriminating enforcement. 
5) Controlling it through criminal sanction will not expose that process to severe 
qualitative or quantitative strains. 
6) There are no reasonable alternatives to criminal sanction for dealing with it." 
Thus, seen in these terms, the question whether or not to attach criminal sanction to a 
particular type of conduct, involves a balancing of interests - on the one hand the 
107 Firstly, it has a social cost, in that the person gets a 'criminal record' and as a result. gets burdened forever. 
Secondly, the economic cost of maintaining and operating the criminal justice system. Tue more crimes are 
created, the bigger and more expensive the infrastructure needs to be. 
108 See Burchell and Milton op cit (n 1) 32. Decriminalisation Act of South Africa 107 ofl991. 
109 H L Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1969) 270. 
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social gains from successful reduction of the conduct in question, 110 and on the other, 
the social, human and financial costs of invoking the criminal s~nction. Only once it is 
clear that to benefits or advantages of invoking criminal sanction outweigh the negative 
consequences referred to above, should the lawmaker criminalise such conduct.111 
C. BENEFITS OF PUNISHING NEGLIGENT ASSAULT 
In the view of the above, the next question to be answered is whether 'negligent assault' 
is deserving of criminal sanction. In trying to answer this question, I am going to first 
discuss the reasons favouring the imposition of criminal sanction, and then I will discuss 
the criticisms of imposing criminal sanction for negligent assault 
A) NEGLIGENT INJURY WITH A FIREARM 
The issue of negligent injury with a firearm is not a new one. It has been debated in 
South African legal circles for many years. In 1956, the Minister of Justice asked the 
Law Revision Committee to consider it. 
110 Packer op cit (n 108) 270. 
111 MA Rabie 'Criteria for the Identification and Creation of Crimes' 1977 SACC 93. 
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The Committee however, did not find in favour of the proposed law reform. The issue 
was again raised in 1967 in the judgement of Ex Parle Minister of Justice In Re S v van 
Wyk.112 In 1972, the Law Revision Committee again considered the matter, and again 
the Committee decided not to propose legislation. In 1977, the Wyethe proposals were 
published.113 This was then followed by similar proposals by Mr. J v R Pietersen, who in 
his arguments referred to the increase in prosecutions relating to the discharge of 
firearms and to the fact that in prosecutions involving injury with a firearm, intention was 
often very difficult to prove.114 Pietersen felt that people were allowing themselves to 
become too 'trigger-happy', and that this should be prevented. 
In the article written by Wyethe,115 he lists the various common law crimes covering the 
shooting of a person, viz. a) murder and culpable homicide (if death resulted); b) 
attempted murder, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and common assault. 
For the all the crimes (with the exception of culpable homicide), proof of subjective 
intention was required. 
Wyethe points out that where a person has negligently injured another person with a 
firearm, the only offence which he can be convicted of is the statutory offence contained 
in s 39 (1) (i) of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 (as amended), which 
penalises a person who "willfully points any arm, air rifle or air revolver at any other 
person". 
112 1967 (1) SA 488 (A). 
113 C F Wyethe "Negligent Injuring of a Person by Means of a Fireann" 1977 The Magistrate 66-68. 
114 J v R Pietersen "Sneller-beheptheid en die miskenningvan do/us eventua/is" 1977 The Magistrate 148-150. 
115 Op cit (n 113) at 66. 
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This provision however, is only concerned with the intentional pointing of a firearm at 
another person, and not with the negligent injury caused to such person as a result of a 
shot that was fired. 116 
Wyethe, like Pietersen, emphasises the difficulty that is often experienced in 
establishing proof of intention beyond reasonable doubt. The dividing line between 
murder (with do/us eventualis)117 and culpable homicide (with negligence) is rather thin. 
This difficulty is apparent if one considers the case of Du Preez, 118 where the accused's 
conviction for murder was altered to culpable homicide on appeal, due to the fact that 
intention in the form of do/us eventualis had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
The facts of the case are as follows: The accused, (who had taken his wife and his son 
for a picnic) fired a warning shot in front of two men who had behaved in an insulting 
manner toward his wife, as a method of scaring them off. The insulting behaviour 
continued and the accused then fired more shots about two or three feet above the 
mens' heads. The final shot hit one of the men in the head and killed him. The accused 
was at all times aiming to miss and never reconciled himself to the possibility of hitting 
the deceased due to the fact that he was confident in his skill as a marksman. 119 The 
accused in this case was convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to 4 years 
imprisonment. 
116 The injury to the person is really the crux of what the legislature needs to prohibit. 
117 See supra for the discussion of do/us eventualis. 
118 1972 (4) SA 877 (A) 879 C. 
119 This is then clearly a case of conscious negligence and not do/us eventualis, as the accused never reconciled 
himself to the possibility of the hitting the deceased. 
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If the deceased was however not killed by the bullet, but merely injured, then the 
accused would have escaped liability. The mere fact that the deceased was killed by 
the bullet, and not merely injured, is determined by a moment of chance. It seems 
ludicrous that the same act can, on the one hand result in criminal liability if the person 
dies, but on the other hand result in no liability if, due to sheer luck the person is merely 
injured (to whatever degree). 
A similar situation arose in Steenkamp120, which demonstrates the inequity that flows 
from the absence of a crime of negligently causing bodily injury in our law. In this case 
the accused was found to have acted negligently in not adopting reasonable precautions 
to ensure that an alleged warning shot fired at the complainant who was attempting to 
escape lawful arrest would not hit him. Milne J, in setting aside a conviction for assault, 
said (at 684) 
"had the complainant died in consequence of the wound inflicted by the bullet, the 
appellant could have been properly found guilty of culpable homicide . . . But where 
some injury not resulting in death is done to another in consequence of an act which 
is merely negligent and is not made criminally punishable by statute ... a criminal 
offence is not committed ... " 
It would appear from this dictum that the determinant of criminal liability in cases of 
'negligent assault' is the consequence which flows from the negligent conduct, thus 
120 Supra (n 4) at 684. 
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where death results, the perpetrator is criminally liable, 121 but where severe injury, just 
short of death, results from identical conduct, the perpetrator would not be criminally 
actionable. 
Hom122 is another case, which demonstrates the possible inequity that may arise due to 
the fact that there is no crime of negligent assault. In this case, the appellant, an 
overseer on a farm, found the deceased stealing pig melons from the lands. In an 
attempt to prevent the deceased from escaping, he fired a shot "just to frighten her", 
intending to fire a few paces to the right. The bullet, however, stuck and killed the 
deceased. The trial court found that the appellant had intention in the form of do/us 
eventualis. 123 On appeal however, the court found that the presence of do/us eventualis 
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court of appeal did however find 
that the appellant was negligent, and therefore guilty of culpable homicide. If however 
the deceased had not been killed by the shot, but merely injured to the extent that she 
was left lying at death's door, and permanently handicapped, the trial court, in finding 
that the accused had intention, would no doubt have convicted the accused of assault. 
However, the Appellate Division, in finding that the appellant had only acted negligently 
and not intentionally, would have had no choice but to find that the appellant was not 
guilty of any crime whatsoever. The fact that the deceased died in this case was totally 
dependent on chance. The same act by the appellant could just have easily left her 
alive, but severely injured. 
121 He can be found guilty of culpable homicide. 
122 1958 (3) SA 457 (A). 
123 i.e. that he foresaw the possibility that the shot might in fact hit and kill the deceased, but he reconciled him-
self to such possibility. 
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Allowing the appellant to escape criminal liability in such circumstances would surely be 
a failure of justice. 
It is in view of the above untenable situation, that Wyethe proposes that it would be "in 
the interests of society, and therefore, completely justified" if a statutory enactment 
penalising the unlawful, negligent injuring of a person by means of a firearm was 
created. 124 He formulates his proposed statutory enactment as follows: "Any person 
discharging a firearm recklessly or negligently and thereby injuring a person or 
endangering the life of a person or damaging property other than his own property, shall 
be guilty of an offence ... "125 
B) MISTAKE126 
In order to be convicted of assault in present South African law, the state has to prove127 
that the accused acted with intention.128 The accused's intention must relate to all the 
elements of the crime, including the act, all the circumstances set out in the definition of 
proscription, and unlawfulness.129 The accused must be aware of all these factors. If he 
is not, then it cannot be said that he intended to commit the crime. This is known as a 
'mistake' or 'error'. 
124 Wyethe op cit (n 113) at 67. 
125 Op cit (n 113) 68. 
126 Mistake in this context refers to a mistake of fact, and not a mistake (or ignorance) oflaw. 
127 Beyond a reasonable doubt. 
128 Of whatever form. See supra. 
129 Snyman op cit (nJ) 176. 
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There are two types of mistakes that are relevant to this discussion. 
i) Mistake relating to circumstances set out in the definition of the proscription130 
An example of this type of mistake is the following. X, while hunting at dusk, sees 
a figure in the distance, which he believes is a buck. He aims and shoots at the 
figure. On closer examination of his prey, he notices that the 'buck' which he shot 
is in actual fact a human being. In this regard, he has made a mistake with regard 
to the definition of proscription of murder, which is, killing of a human being. 
Provided X's mistake was a material one, 131 he could not be found guilty of 
murder, due to the fact that his mistake nullified his intention. Due to the fact that 
the test for intention is completely subjective, 132 X's mistake need not be reason-
able.133 X can therefore not be found guilty of murder if he made a material 
mistake, even if such mistake is totally unreasonable. However, it will not 
necessarily follow that X will not be convicted of anything. Although his mistake 
excludes his intention, the circumstances may well be such that he was negligent. 
X would have acted negligently if a reasonable person in the same circumstances 
would have foreseen that he figure he was aiming at was not a buck, but in fact a 
human being. If the court finds that X had acted unlike a reasonable person in the 
circumstances, then he will be convicted of culpable homicide. 
130 The definition of proscription signifies the concise description of the requirements set by the law for liability 
for a specific type of crime. 
It does not refer to the 'general requirements' applying to all crimes, e.g. voluntary act, unlawfulness etc., but 
the particular requirements applying only to a certain type of crime. 
131 A mistake will be material if it relates to all the elements of the offence referred to above. In this example, 
X's mistake would not be material if he aimed at a figure which he believed to be a human, but on closer 
examination, the person he shot was not the human he had in mind, but another person unknown to x. The 
definition of proscription for murder is, the killing of a human being, and not the killing of a specific human 
being. 
132 Malinga, Mini supra (n 46) 694, 192. 
133 Modise 1966 (4) SA 680 (GW); Sam 1980 (4) SA 289 (T). 
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It is at this point that the lack of a crime of negligent assault may result in a lacuna 
in the law. Let us consider the following situation. In the same example given 
above, let us assume that X's mistake in subjectively believing that he was 
shooting a buck was totally unreasonable. On an examination of the facts, the 
court comes to the conclusion that X had been grossly negligent in shooting at the 
figure in question. If the bullet had killed the person whom X had negligently 
mistaken for a buck, X would almost certainly been convicted of culpable 
homicide. If however, the bullet fired by X, in exactly the same circumstances, 
had not killed the person in question, but severely injured him to the extent that 
he was left permanently handicapped, then the court would have no option but to 
find that X is not guilty of any crime. 
C) ABERRATIO ICTUS SITUATIONS 
Aberratio ictus means the going astray of the blow. 134 It is not a form of mistake. X 
pictures what he is aiming at correctly, but through a lack of skill, clumsiness or other 
factors he misses what he is aiming at and hits somebody or something else. 
Originally, our courts 135 applied the transferred intent approach to aberratio ictus 
situations. In terms of this approach, X's intention in respect of the person at whom the 
shot was aimed, is transferred to the person who was eventually struck. This would be 
the case even where X in no way foresaw the possibility of the shot striking such other 
person. The transferred intent approach was however later rejected in favour of the 
concrete intent approach. 
134 Snyman op cit (n 1) 181. 
135 Kuzwayo 1949 (3) SA 761 (A); Koza 1949 (4) SA 555 (A). 
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This latter approach was more in line with the subjective nature of intention136 and the 
rejection of versari in re illicita doctrine.137 In Mtshiza 138, Holmes JA held that aberratio 
ictus situations should be judged as follows: 
a) X will normally always be guilty of attempted murder in respect of the person 
which he wished to, but did not kill. 
b) As far as X's liability in respect of the person actually struck by the blow (Z) is 
concerned, there are three possibilities: 
i) If he had foreseen that Z could be struck by the blow, and had reconciled 
himself to this possibility, he had do/us eventualis in respect of Z's death and 
is guilty of murder in respect of Z. 
ii) If he had not foreseen the possibility that his blow might strike Z139, or if he 
had foreseen such a possibility, but had not reconciled himself to this 
possibility140, he lacked do/us eventualis and can therefore not be guilty of 
murder. This does not necessarily mean that, as far as Z's death is 
concerned, he has not committed any crime. If the evidence reveals that he 
had caused Z's death negligently, he is guilty of culpable homicide. 
iii) If it is established that there was neither intention141 nor negligence on his part, 
then he will not be guilty of any crime in respect of Z's death. 
The above method of dealing with aberratio ictus situations142, adequately meets the 
needs of a factual situation in which the shot that went awry kills the innocent victim. 
However, it offers no solution to the following set of facts. 
136 Supra (n46). 
137 Bemardus 1965 (3) SA 287 (A). 
138 1970 (3) SA 747 (A). 
139 Titis would be a case of unconscious negligence. 
140 Titis would be a case of conscious negligence. 
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X intends to kill his archenemy Y, by shooting him. X goes to Y's house and shoots at 
him through an open window. Just at that point, Y's six year old child (Z) runs past the 
window and the bullet hits the child in the head. If the bullet killed Z, then the method 
described above would offer a solution. What if, however, the bullet merely left Z in a 
state of invalidism? If the court finds that X in no way foresaw the possibility of Z 
running in the line of fire, or if he did foresee it, he did not reconcile himself to such 
foresight, the court can then not convict X of murdering Z, as X did not subjectively have 
the required intention. The court will then have no choice but to find X not guilty of any 
crime in respect of Y. This will be the case even if the court finds that x was grossly 
negligent in shooting Z.143 
Once again, the inequity of not punishing negligent assault, is apparent. If Z had died as 
a result of the negligent shot fired by X, then X would have been convicted of culpable 
homicide. However, a serious, near death injury resulting from the same negligent act, 
goes unpunished. 
141 In these instances the form of intention mostly found is do/us eventualis. 
142 Which was confirmed in: Tissen 1979 (4) SA 293 (1) at 135 andMavhungu 1981 (1) SA 56 (A) at 137. 
143 In that. as a reasonable person he should have foreseen the possibility that Z might be hit by the shot, and did 
not take any steps to prevent such possibility. 
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D) EXCEEDING THE BOUNDS OF PRIVATE DEFENCE 
A person acts in private defence144, and his act is therefore lawful, if he uses force to 
repel an unlawful attack, provided his defensive act is necessary to protect the interest 
threatened and is not more harmful than necessary to ward off the attack. 
If the attacked party exceeds the limits of private defence, by for example, causing more 
harm to the attacker than is justified by the attack, then he himself acts unlawfully.145 
The next question for the court to answer, is whether or not the person who exceeds the 
bounds of defence, has the required culpability for a conviction of murder or culpable 
homicide.146 If X (the person who was originally attacked) is aware of the fact that he is 
exceeding the bounds of private defence, he is then acting with knowledge of 
unlawfulness, and therefore intentionally. He would also be acting with intention if he 
subjectively foresees the possibility that he may be exceeding the bounds of private 
defence, and he then reconciles himself to this possibility. 
In these circumstances, X could be convicted of murder.147 If however, intention is 
absent, X may nevertheless be convicted of culpable homicide if he ought to have 
reasonably foreseen that he might be exceeding the bounds of private defence and that 
he might kill the aggressor. He is then negligent in respect of the death.148 
If however, X, in the course of exceeding the limits of private defence, does not kill the 
original aggressor, but merely injures him, there are only two possibilities - either he will 
144 The words 'private defence' is to be preferred to 'self defence'. The reason for this is that the interests that 
can be protected by acting in private defence are not restricted to the person acting in defence. Any legally 
recognised interest (even that of another person) may be protected in 'private defence'. See Snyman op cit 
(n 1) 99. 
145 I.e. he becomes the attacker himself. 
146 Being intention or negligence respectively. 
147 Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 429 (A). 
148 Ngomane 1979 (3) SA 859 (A) 863. 
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be guilty of assault (if the required intention is present) or he will not be guilty of any 
crime (if negligence was present).149 
Again, we can see the untenable situation which arises. If X negligently exceeds the 
bounds of defence, and in the process kills the original aggressor, he will be guilty of 
culpable homicide. If however, X, with the same blameworthy act, severely injures the 
original aggressor in a negligent manner, he will then escape criminal liability entirely. 
E) VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
After the decision in Chrieten150, an accused who committed a crime while intoxicated, 
was allowed a complete defence. If the accused's intoxication resulted in him being 
unable to form an intention, not having criminal capacity or being unable to perform a 
voluntary act, then he could be acquitted on the charge for which intention was the 
required form of mens rea. This decision was severely criticised in various quarters, as it 
resulted in a socially unacceptable situation where a sober person is punished for 
criminal conduct, whereas the same conduct committed by a drunken person is 
pardoned, merely because he was drunk. 
This criticism resulted in legislation being passed in 1988, which was clearly aimed at 
preventing a drunken person from escaping liability in such cases. Section 1 of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988 changed the position under Chrieten151 . The 
effect of the Act is that a person who is so intoxicated at the time of the commission of 
149 In practice, most cases of exceeding the bounds of private defence will not involve intention, but mostly 
negligence. The attacked person nonnally retaliates and 'intends' (in the form of direction of will) to put the 
aggressor out of action. However the second leg of intention (knowledge of unlawfulness) will usually not be 
present. In such a case, the court could then find that the attacked person should have known he was acting 
unlawfully, and that he was therefore negligent. 
150 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A). 
151 Supra. 
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the offence, that he lacks criminal capacity or the ability to perform a voluntary act152, 
shall be guilty of contravening the section and shall be liable for the same punishment as 
he would have got had he committed the crime whilst in a sober state. 
The act did, however, not block all escape routes for the accused. If his intoxication only 
affected him to the extent that it excluded his intention153, then he will be found not guilty 
in terms of the Chrieten position and in terms of Act 1 of 1988. Thus if X assaulted Y 
while he (X) was intoxicated to the extent that he lacked criminal capacity or the ability to 
act, then he would be convicted of contravening section 1 (1) of Act 1 of 1988. If 
however X assaults Y while he is intoxicated only to the extent that he did not have 
intention, then he will be acquitted. If X's assault upon Yin the latter instance resulted in 
Y's death, then X could still not be convicted of murder, but will be convicted of culpable 
homicide. Acts committed whilst by a person who is voluntarily intoxicated will be 
regarded by the courts as being performed negligently. The reason for this finding is to 
be found in the objective test for negligence. A reasonable man would not have indulged 
in excessive consumption of alcohol. Thus, the person's intoxication will be a pointer 
towards negligence. If however, X's assault upon Y merely resulted in Y being injured, 
the court would have to find X not guilty of any crime. 154 
152 The act only refers to a person that lacks criminal capacity. It can however be assumed that it also refers to a 
person who cannot perform a voluntary act, as this would result from an even more intoxicated state. 
153 As opposed to his criminal capacity and ability to perform a voluntary act. 
154 This in spite of the fact that X had been negligent in indulging excessively in alcohol. 
31 
s. Critical analysis 
The various scenario's discussed above clearly indicate that there is prima facie a need 
to create a crime of negligent assault. However, identifying the problem is just the tip of 
the iceberg. Providing a solution to the problem is often the most challenging obstacle in 
the way of the lawmaker. When deciding whether to criminalise conduct or not, the 
following considerations must be taken into account. 
First, the effect that the criminalising of the conduct will have on society must be 
considered. Crimes are created to protect certain interests, such as human rights and 
collective welfare. The criminal sanction is a mechanism that coerces members of 
society, through the threat of punishment, to abstain from conduct which is harmful to 
public interests. The community is entitled to protect its interests, even sometimes at the 
expense of the rights of the individual155. Such interests include human life, physical 
integrity and dignity156. The criminalisation has to be justified in terms of the Constitution. 
No act should therefore be criminally proscribed unless its incidence, actual or potential, 
is substantially dangerous to society. 
Our legislature has on previous occasions intervened and made criminal certain 
negligent acts. The National Road Traffic Act157 provides that no person shall drive a 
vehicle on a public road recklessly or negligently158. The Arms and Ammunition Act159 
provides that any person who discharges an arm and thereby negligently injures or 
endangers the life or limb of another is guilty of an offence160. 
155 Only if the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution are complied with. 
156 Supra n 7 & 8. 
157 93of1996. 
158 s 63 (1). 
159 75of1969. 
160 s 39 (1). 
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However, the mere fact that the legislature criminalised these acts, does not necessarily 
imply that negligent assault can also be criminally proscribed. The effectiveness of legal 
threats must be based on recognition of the differences between the offences. As 
Andenaes puts it, "Simple common sense indicates that a threat of punishment does not 
play the same role in offences as different as murder, rape, tax evasion, shoplifting or 
illegal parking"161 . Negligent assault is clearly not the same as negligent driving. Driving 
is part and parcel of everyday life. There is almost universal consensus as to what 
constitutes proper driving standards. Van Rooyen162 crisply summarises this point by 
referring to the fact that "there is a pervasive infrastructure of social control' relating to 
motor car driving, which together with criminal sanction, could play a meaningful role in 
ensuring safe passage on streets and roads". 
Punishing negligent driving would therefore appear to be more acceptable from a social 
point of view. In contrast however, there is no generally accepted standard which applies 
to cases of negligent assault. 
There is also the fear in many quarters that punishing negligent conduct, beyond the 
traditionally recognised situations, could lead to over-criminalisation. The fear is that all 
crimes requiring intention for a conviction, may possibly be extended to provide for 
negligence as a sufficient form of mens rea. 
If, however, we consider the crime of assault, we will notice the following. Assault is a 
crime committed against another person's corpus. It results in the infringement of 
another's body, which does not result in death163. 
161 Andenaes "The General Preventive Effects of Punislunent" (1%6) 114 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 950 at 957. 
162 JH van Rooyen "Negligent Injury with a Fireann: Punish or Prevent?" 1978 SA CC 121. 
163 The act will remain assault regardless of the injury sustained. 
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If the infringement of the person's body is so severe that it results in the person's death, 
then the crime of murder is committed. In essence, both crimes involve similar acts. It is 
just the result which differs. Murder however, has a negligent counterpart - culpable 
homicide. 
Any person who negligently causes the death of another person shall be guilty of a crime. 
Due to the fact that murder has a negligent form, it is easier to justify creating a negligent 
form of assault. 
Secondly, foreign jurisdictions can be consulted and used as guidelines. South Africa is 
an open and democratic state, which has a supreme constitution. Therefore, when 
considering the position in foreign jurisdictions, one should constantly bear in mind that 
any law passed in South Africa will have to be justified in terms of our constitution. In 
Germany (a country which is regarded as being open and democratic, based on human 
dignity and equality), the Criminal Code provides that whoever causes bodily _harm to 
another through negligence shall be punished by up to three years imprisonment or a 
fine164. When considering German Law, it should be noted that while the test for 
negligence is still in principle an objective test, it involves more subjective considerations 
than the South African test.165 Both 'conscious' and 'unconscious' negligence is 
recognised. Therefore, in considering German Law, the different approach to negligence 
should constantly be borne in mind. 
164 S 230 of the Gennan Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). Cf American Law Institute Model Penal Code, which in 
s 211.1 sets out the offence of negligently causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon. 
165 CR Snyman Criminal Law 2nd ed (1989) at 225. 
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Thirdly, one must with reference to the various theories of punishment, consider the 
effectiveness of creating negligent assault. Punishing negligent assault may be difficult 
to justify in terms of the various theories of punishment, as will be explained below. 
a) Negligence and general deterrence 
The theory of general deterrence in its basic form relies on the deterrent effect of the 
threat of punishment. Rabie summarises this theory as follows: 166 "The idea is that man, 
being a rational creature, would refrain from the commission of crimes if he should know 
that the unpleasant consequences will follow the commission of certain acts." 
This classic utilitarian theory of punishment would appear to have a very suited 
application to crime, which involves the subjective form of mens rea, namely intention. 
After all, the accused subjectively and consciously directed his will towards performing a 
certain act which he knew was unlawful". However, the question is to what extent it is 
applicable to crimes of negligence, keeping in mind that the test for negligence (save for 
a few exceptions)167, is objective - i.e. that of an objectively reasonable man. A person 
who commits a negligent crime has not given any thought to the consequences of his act. 
166 Rabie Theories of Punishment (1977) at 29. 
167 E.g.: in the case of children and experts. 
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b) Negligence and retribution 
Retribution can be regarded as a reflection of the community's condemnation of a 
crime168. The community is angered by the commission of crimes and insists that they 
be punished. If the state fails to punish offenders, this could result in the members of the 
community taking the law into their own hands to avenge the crimes. Turner169 contends 
that the only moral test on which criminal punishment should be based, is that of actual 
foresight of the consequences of one's conduct. This will only be the case with 
subjective intention. 
Retribution presupposes moral guilt. An accused that directs his will towards a particular 
result or act, with knowledge of unlawfulness, clearly can be said to be morally guilty170. 
However, when dealing with negligent acts, the presence of moral guilt will not always be 
that easy to establish. Williams, Glanville object to the application of the retributive theory 
of punishment to negligent conduct. They state: 171 
"Some people are born reckless, clumsy, thoughtless, inattentive, irresponsible, with 
a bad memory and a 'slow reaction time'. With the best will in the world, we all of us 
at some times in our lives make negligent mistakes. It is hard to see how justice .... 
requires mistakes to be punished". 
Likewise, Hall172 argues in favour of a policy that actual culpability, not the objective 
standard of the "reasonable man", should be the only test for penal liability. 
168 
"Emphatic denunciation by the community of the crime", according to Lord Denning in his evidence before 
the Royal British Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) 18. 
169 Radzinowitz and Turner The Modern Approach to Criminal Law ( 1948) 207. 
170 Provided of course, all the other elements of criminal liability are satisfied. 
171 Glanville Williams supra n 103 122. 
172 General Principles of Criminal Law 2nd ed (1960) 139. 
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He states that the requirement of a subjective mens rea (i.e. intention in its various 
forms), as opposed to an objective standard as in negligence, "represents not only the 
perennial view of moral culpability, but also the plain man's morality".173 He therefore 
rejects negligence as a basis for criminal liability, on the basis of the retributive principle. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Providing a solution to a given problem is not always as simple as it seems. However, 
identifying the problem is always a step in the right direction. It is evident from the above 
that there is a need for the existence of the crime of negligent assault. As already 
indicated, various factors must be taken into account before such decision to criminalise 
can be taken. Only if the social benefits of criminalising the conduct outweigh the 
negative implications of not criminalising the conduct, should the lawmaker intervene. 
It is my submission, that despite these difficulties, the legislature should intervene and 
criminally proscribe negligent assault. South African mores have been sculpted by the 
introduction of our supreme Constitution, which inter alia protects our rights to our 
physical integrity and dignity. These fundamental human rights have now been accorded 
even higher status than before. The legislature would therefore, in my opinion, not err if it 
were to extend the protection given to a person's physical integrity and dignity even 
further, by creating the crime of negligent assault. 
173 Ibid 
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